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One of the key underexplored aspects of Brexit is the way in which it took place against a backdrop 
of sharp regional differences across the UK and the fact that there is not one system of governance 
in UK but multiple ones.  In many ways, the Brexit vote has shone a harsh light on something that 
academics and practitioners have known for years: regional differences matter.  In the West 
Midlands, almost 60% of votes were to leave the EU.  In London, almost 60% of votes were to 
remain.  Indeed, some have argued that the vote should be seen as the “revenge of places that don’t 
matter”[1].  This has occurred in spite of the fact that EU structural funding has been concentrated in 
many of these regions. 
An upcoming book by Centre Director Professor De Ruyter and myself explores many of these issues 
in more detail[2].  We consider what place-based and people-focussed policy responses might be 
optimal for dealing with many of these underlying issues laid bare by the Brexit vote.  A key factor in 
all of this, and which is particularly pertinent in light of government plans to replace European 
structural funding with a proposed “Shared Prosperity Fund” is how we can quantify what success 
and failure look like. 
Our research highlights that measures traditionally used in the allocation of regional funding 
(especially measures of regional economic output) are not fit for purpose.  Particularly egregious is 
the ongoing use of GVA per capita in spite of the fact that the ONS[3] and Gripaios and Bishop[4], 
amongst others, have demonstrated that it is not a measure of either regional productivity or 
regional wellbeing.  Commuting and demographics both grossly distort GVA per capita when 
measured on a sub-regional level: GVA per capita is higher in Islington (represented by the 
constituencies of Jeremy Corbyn and Emily Thornberry) than in Kensington and Chelsea. 
Similarly, demographics alone can account for 17.8% of the disparity in GVA per head between 
London and the South West.  It is thus unsurprising that GVA per capita is almost uncorrelated with 
unemployment at the local authority level.  We therefore propose a number of existing measures 
that illustrate interesting aspects of relative regional prosperity. The forthcoming book then 
demonstrates that all existing monetary measures (whether of wages, household incomes or gross 
value added) are flawed measures of living standards and real economic output because they fail to 
take account of the fact that regional prices differ substantially across the UK.  This includes the 
income portion of the vaunted Index of Multiple Deprivation. 
This effect is easy to see: according to the Good Pub Guide, a pint of beer is almost one-third more 
expensive in London than in Yorkshire.  As such, a Londoner needs to be earning considerably more 
in order to consume the same quantity of beer as his or her counterpart in Yorkshire.  It’s not just 
beer: a wide variety of goods and services are more expensive in London and the South than the rest 
of the country.  The cost of renting or buying a house in London is vastly different to that in Scotland. 
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Using a variety of official data, we construct a series of different regional price indices that are suited 
to different purposes and show that some of the gaps between different parts of the country are 
narrower than hitherto believed and that median real wages differ relatively little across the 
country.  We also show, however, that the relative positions of different regions change dramatically 
and that gaps in living standards remain substantial. 
 
As can be seen from the above graph, the gap between London and the rest narrows 
dramatically.  Moreover, the poorest region is not in the North: rather it lies in the industrial 
heartlands of the Midlands (although not shown, the East Midlands conurbation of Nottingham 
ranks similarly).  It is perhaps no accident that the “missing middle” of the UK voted most strongly 
for Brexit.  In contrast, our figures show Scotland overtaking the South East of England in terms of 
productivity (and only marginally behind in terms of incomes – probably due to the fact that so many 
in the South East commute to London to take advantage of the capital’s higher nominal salaries). 
Finally, we consider what national and regional policymakers (and other stakeholders) can and 
should do in response to this.  Clearly getting regional funding mechanisms “right” post-Brexit is a 
key element.  The Shared Prosperity Fund will need careful design to ensure that it targets the right 
regions.  Indeed, our work tentatively suggests that successful devolution may play a role in 
fostering inclusive economic growth.  As pointed out in Gill Bentley’s previous blog post and 
elsewhere[5], successful policies to foster growth that benefits the entire country must be aware of 
the spatial economic context rather than being “space-blind”. 
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